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In this Journal, Merrick B. Garland recently criticized my article, A
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism.' I based my argument there on
the familiar notion that businesses, for their own anticompetitive profit,
can capture the governmental bodies and policies that supposedly regulate
them in the public interest. I claim that this "capture theory" illuminates
past Supreme Court decisions concerning "antitrust federalism": the issue
of which state and local laws are preempted by the federal Sherman Act. I
further suggest that federal judges could overcome flaws in current doc-
trine by incorporating the notion of capture into future decisions. Mr.
Garland responds that I am a revisionist, and a dangerous one at that. He
defends current doctrine, and asserts that a capture theory inaccurately
describes case law, improperly adopts economic efficiency as a preemptive
federal goal, and leads to dangerous problems. Mr. Garland's analysis is
thoughtful and scholarly. But I hope to convince readers that my argu-
ment survives his apology for current doctrine.
I. DESCRIPTIVELY INACCURATE?
Mr. Garland devotes the bulk of his effort to attacking the descriptive
power of a capture approach, and I therefore concentrate my comments on
this topic. Mr. Garland argues that a capture theory fails to describe the
t Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank Rob Boyd, Harold Demsetz, Jim
Liebeler, Stan Ornstein, Mark Ramseyer, Eric Rasmussen, Ken Taymor, Mike Waldman, and Eric
Zolt for helpful conversations about New York's system of liquor regulation and, inevitably, Steve
Yeazell for a variety of insightful comments.
1. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE
L.J. 486 (1986) (criticizing Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARv. L. REV.
713 (1986)).
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decisions since the seminal case of Parker v. Brown precisely.2 I could not
agree more. No sensible theory does. That is the problem.
I argue that Parker built its state action doctrine upon deference to
states; that a significant number' of decisions since Parker have interfered
with state regulatory autonomy; and that this interference is consistent
with a change in intellectual climate from ready acceptance to marked
suspicion of the benefits of regulation. I conclude that this growing suspi-
cion of regulation has created a tension in antitrust federalism doctrine
that was absent in Parker.4 This tension makes understandable, although
it certainly does not reconcile, the substantial disarray within the post-
Parker case law.5
Mr. Garland claims that he has a better account of the cases since
Parker. He argues that the Court has been balancing respect for state and
national political processes. In his view, the Court distinguishes between
exempt "public" and reviewable "private" restraints by assessing a given
policy's degree of delegation to private decisionmaking. Mr. Garland ac-
knowledges that I present just this characterization as the stated tendency
of doctrine since the Midcal case.6 He and I differ only in our satisfaction
with this level of analysis. Mr. Garland likes and defends it; I criticize
and reject it. I find this account of recent antitrust federalism so unrespon-
sive to both antitrust and federalism concerns as to be symptomatic of a
deeper and largely unarticulated clash of values-a clash that I seek to
identify and describe.'
Mr. Garland states that decisions since Parker have sought to "recon-
cile the Court's respect for the political process in the states with its re-
spect for the national political process." 8 This restatement of the antitrust
federalism problem is not very helpful. To respect state political processes
means to uphold local laws against federal attack. To respect the national
political process means to enforce federal laws. The Court can do both
only in the easy cases where local and federal policies do not really con-
flict. Cases in which there really is conflict are also easy, because the
2. 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Garland, supra note 1, at 489-518.
3. I say eight; Mr. Garland says six. Garland, supra note 1, at 492 n.34. Mr. Garland excludes
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), and Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), because
those decisions spend little or no time discussing Parker. I agree that neither decision dwells on the
state action issue, Wiley, supra note 1, at 720, 722. However, Mr. Garland does not dispute my point
that neither result would have been possible had the Court accepted a state action defense.
4. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 715.
5. See id. at 722-23, 736-39.
6. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); see
Garland, supra note 1, at 501 & n.86 (citing my delegation analysis with approval).
7. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 723 ("These cases suggest that something has been challenging
Parker's premise of deference to state regulatory policy, though their language gives little clue about
what that thing is.").
8. Garland, supra note 1, at 499.
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supremacy clause dictates that federal law always wins in real show-
downs. Saying that courts "reconcile" respect for both local and federal
laws declares that courts do either the obvious or the impossible. This
description does not take us far.
Mr. Garland also says that the Court has sought to separate "true state
regulation" from "mere state 'authorization' of private conduct." 9 This
description is also unhelpful. Mr. Garland's faith in the naturalness of
any one criterion for distinguishing between public and private action is
vulnerable to the decades of scholarship that have exploded the idea that
some natural line divides public from private action. The choice of any
particular criterion for labelling an act as "true" state action rather than
"mere" private action reflects-and must be defended in terms
of-pursuit of some value.1 Saying that the Court is dividing public from
private action restates the question but supplies no answer.
So we come to the portion of Mr. Garland's argument that is key to
any convincing defense of reigning doctrine: a policy rationale for the
Court's particular choice of a delegation criterion for distinguishing
"true" public from "mere" private action. On this score, Mr. Garland
fails.
The Court cannot have adopted an antidelegation doctrine out of regard
for state autonomy, for the fact of delegation need show nothing about the
authenticity of state will. Mr. Garland agrees that, for instance, the Mid-
cal decision is good law. 2 But that decision tore entire sections out of the
California Business and Professions Code by airily declaring them to be
"essentially . . . private.""' That is not respect for states' rights. And
neither the Court nor Mr. Garland demonstrates that state policies ad-
ministered directly by bureaucrats are closer to the "true" hearts and
minds of state citizens than are state policies that delegate considerable
discretion to citizens. Californians might defend their community property
laws, for example, with considerably more passion than their public util-
ity regulations, even though-perhaps indeed because-community prop-
erty laws effectuate citizens' decisions with little assistance from people on
the state payroll.
By the same token, the Court cannot have adopted an antidelegation
doctrine out of simple regard for federal antitrust policy. Antitrust com-
mentators have fought long over whether populism, efficiency, or wealth
9. Id. at 501.
10. See, e.g., Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1302 n.21 (1982) (surveying literature).
11. Id. at 1302.
12. Garland, supra note 1, at 507.
13. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106 (1980).
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distribution are proper or decisive antitrust goals. 4 But this debate has
never included a goal of centralized or nondelegated state decisionmaking.
If anything, the populist ideal of decentralization often found in the Sher-
man Act condemns this objective outright. If, alternatively, the goal of
federal antitrust law is economic efficiency or just distribution of wealth,
we again see no reliable correspondence between these objectives and an
attack on state delegation. Analysts today commonly argue, for example,
that delegated resale price maintenance of the type condemned in Midcal
can in fact promote efficiency and consumer well-being. 5 Hoover v.
Ronwin ' and Parker itself provide obvious converse examples: bureau-
cratically administered programs that probably offended every antitrust
goal . 7 From the standpoint of substantive antitrust policy, then, how a
state implements its policy, rather than what its policy is, is a poor crite-
rion for triggering intrusions on state autonomy.' Antidelegation policy is
irrational antitrust policy.
The Court's recent decision in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy' 9 applies the
doctrine that Mr. Garland defends and I criticize. In that decision, the
Court unanimously ruled that section 1 of the Sherman Act preempted a
New York law barring retailers from discounting liquor below a price
yielding them less than a twelve percent retail profit.20 The Court's opin-
ion contained no extensive or definitive analysis of the markup law's ac-
14. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 1, at 749 n.165 (summarizing literature).
15. See, e.g., Gilligan, The Competitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 17 RAND J. EcoN.
546-47 (1986) (summarizing debate).
16. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
17. Cartels are a plain antitrust evil on every score. They aggregate the scale of business decision-
making and so affront populists, restrict supply and thereby rile efficiency proponents, and enable
producers to appropriate surplus and thus offend distributivists. Parker involved state agricultural
regulation that apparently created a raisin cartel. While some will doubt Mr. Ronwin's claim that the
officially administered Arizona bar exam was a cartel entry barrier, his case's procedural posture
forced the Court to accept this possibility for purposes of its decision. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 565-66.
18. Nor does antidelegation policy promote procedures that serve federal antitrust interests. Sup-
pose we fear that a state legislature may adopt policies that offend substantive federal interests: poli-
cies that are anticompetitive, anticonsumer, and inefficient. I have argued that we have no dependable
reason to believe that the procedural hoops that Midcal requires will protect federal interests. See
Wiley, supra note 1, at 731-33 & nn.92 & 93. Mr. Garland expresses no disagreement.
19. 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987).
20. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the Twenty-First Amendment offered no protection for the state law at issue, but no Justice
dissented from the majority's Sherman Act analysis. See 107 S. Ct. at 730-34.
The mandatory markup regulation set liquor price floors by directing wholesalers to "post" (that is,
file with the State Liquor Authority (SLA)) a "bottle price" that applied to all New York liquor
retailers. See N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CoNT. LAw §§ 101-b3(b), 101-b2, 101-bb2(b) (McKinney 1970). But
bottle price did not necessarily represent the real "case price" at which transactions between wholesal-
ers and retailers in fact occurred; a state regulation gave wholesalers the option of discounting case
prices to retailers without lowering the bottle price filed with the SLA. See SLA Bulletin 471, quoted
in 107 S. Ct. at 723 n.4. The regulation thus guaranteed retailers a minimum twelve percent profit,
which grew larger as wholesalers discounted real "case prices" below the posted "bottle prices" that
set the price floor to retailers' customers.
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tual anticompetitive effect. Rather it mentioned a variety of possibilities
and finally asserted that "the purpose of the 12 percent minimum markup
is to protect small retailers."'"I
The Court had reason to believe that the markup law had some an-
ticonsumer effect. According to a number of explanations, resale price
maintenance policies can promote efficiency and consumer welfare, but
economists have questioned the applicability of these explanations to the
liquor industry.22 A different explanation for resale price maintenance
posits a retailers' cartel. 23 While the New York law apparently gave li-
quor dealers less than a complete and simple cartel,24 the law's legislative
history suggests a variation on the same theme: a ban on the selectively
aggressive pricing or "loss leaders" about which losing retailers had com-
plained to the legislature.25 As a prima facie matter at least, the Court
thus was entitled to assume that the regulation aimed to restrain retailer
competition (although perhaps only one type of aggressive promotional
pricing) for the benefit of less efficient liquor stores.
21. 107 S. Ct. at 728. The opinion mentioned four apparently different and potentially contradic-
tory theories about the law's effect: (1) facilitation of horizontal collusion among manufacturers; (2)
facilitation of horizontal collusion among wholesalers; (3) establishment of a horizontal price floor for
the benefit of retailers; and (4) strengthening the vertical control of distillers over wholesalers. 107 S.
Ct. at 724. The Court did not offer analysis or data to support one theory over the others.
22. See Ornstein & Hanssens, Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing or Restricting? The
Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. (forthcoming 1987); cf. Fenili &
Lane, Thou Shalt Not Cut Prices!, REG., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 31, 33-35 ("general [sales below cost]
laws cost consumers more than S6.7 billion in 1982); Smith, An Analysis of State Regulations Gov-
erning Liquor Store Licensees, 25 J.L. & ECON. 301, 319 (1982) (generally ascribing liquor regula-
tions to political capture rather than pursuit of economic efficiency).
23. See, e.g., Gilligan, supra note 15, at 545-46. Still a different account portrays resale price
maintenance as the tool of a manufacturers' or wholesalers' cartel. See Telser, Why Should Manufac-
turers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 96-99 (1960). The New York markup law possibly
facilitated such supplier cartelization. By requiring suppliers who sell to retailers to disclose their case
as well as bottle prices publicly, § 101-b3(b) of the New York law reduced the destabilizing threat of
secret discounting by suppliers to retailers. But suppliers' cartels ought to oppose the policy of SLA
Bulletin 471, quoted in 107 S. Ct. at 723 n.4, permitting suppliers to discount case prices without
reducing bottle prices. See supra note 20. This policy seems to enable suppliers to increase retailers'
margins-an undesirable result from the perspective of a selfish manufacturer or wholesaler cartel
trying to appropriate the entire monopoly profit. This "upstream cartel" explanation thus accounts
only imperfectly for the details of the New York law.
24. The nominal 12% margin hardly seems a monopoly margin and may be significant only when
compared to single-digit markups in highly efficient retail stores like supermarkets-a comparison
that might be unrealistic for the retail liquor industry. The Court did cite evidence that wholesalers
sometimes advertised case discounts that would yield retail markups in excess of 30%. 107 S. Ct. at
723. But the Court offered neither theoretical explanation why wholesalers would do so nor system-
atic data confirming that this practice had been more than sporadic.
25. In a triumph of euphemism over competition, the legislative history of New York's 1971 law
reported that "competitive excesses" plagued New York liquor retailing. N.Y. LEGISLATURE, SENATE
EXCISE COMM., FINAL REPORT 22 (Mar. 5, 1971) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. After describing the
evils of "loss leaders," the report condemned existing New York regulation for permitting pricing,
"unduly geared to consumer prices, that [did] not realistically provide for the continuance of the retail
level of [the liquor] industry. This failure would appear to represent a substantial economic disloca-
tion that might be deemed disruptive of the economy of an entire industry." Id. at 25.
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This analysis of New York's law puts it squarely at odds with substan-
tive antitrust goals. The Sherman Act directs liquor retailers to compete
for the benefit of consumers; New York instead enforced a degree of
dealer cooperation that victimized consumers. However, the 324 Liquor
Court decided that the state law was invalid not on the basis of this plain
substantive conflict with federal interests, but rather because New York's
system contained a procedural flaw: "New York's liquor pricing system is
not actively supervised by the State.
' 26
This "active supervision" requirement is pointless and costly. It con-
demns New York's cartel effort only for involving too few hearings and
bureaucrats, not for being illegitimate at its core. Consequently current
doctrine permits states to pursue the same anticompetitive end as long as
they incorporate the Court's directions for supervision.
Certainly New York liquor retailers could demand that the state legis-
lature ornament their substantive anticompetitive concern with new regu-
latory processes. But encouraging a more cumbersome regulatory maze
lacks federal purpose. Intricacy need alter not one whit New York's regu-
latory objective of restricting retail competition for the benefit of ineffi-
cient firms. Nor will throwing more bureaucrats at the problem make
some revised regulatory structure a metaphysically "truer" expression of
authentic state will. Moreover, 324 Liquor's rule that government must
regulate only clumsily can apply to and thereby hamper a great many
state regulations-not just those substantively undesirable from the stand-
point of antitrust goals. The Court's ruling therefore will benefit no one
but New York law firms eager to enliven their administrative practice.
Because I am dissatisfied with accounts of antitrust federalism like the
one 324 Liquor applies and Mr. Garland defends, I look for a more fun-
damental and satisfying account of recent antitrust federalism. Hence I
make my claim that a new tension in the field-an increasing federal sus-
picion of regulation 2 8 -is the best explanation for the Court's erratic but
undeniable incursions on state autonomy since Parker.29
26. 107 S. Ct. at 725 (emphasis added). "[T]he State does not control month-to-month variations
in posted prices. Nor does the State supervise the wholesaler's decision to 'post off,' . . . the corre-
sponding decrease, if any, in the bottle price, or the frequency with which a wholesaler posts off." Id.
at 726.
27. For instance, New York could require wholesalers to submit proposed prices to the SLA in
advance. It could demand that the SLA examine these proposals at length. And it could order the
SLA to approve only those filings that truly block retail price rivalry.
28. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 728.
29. I quite agree with Mr. Garland's observation that the Court has not overturned every state
law that may have been a product of industry capture. Compare Garland, supra note 1, at 491 (New
Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978), ignored element of capture) and Gar-
land, supra note 1, at 491 n.32 (Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), ignored element of capture)
with Wiley, supra note 1, at 746 & n.155 and Wiley, supra note 1, at 739 n.131. I likewise join him
in criticizing the plainly false proposition that state action cases "exhibit an inexorable trend toward
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II. INDEFENSIBLE EFFICIENCY VOGUE?
From his title to his final page, Mr. Garland criticizes my work for
relying inappropriately on economic analysis. He also associates my work
with that of prominent Chicago school analysts-most often Judge Easter-
brook. This linkage arrests me and probably the Chicagoans: me, because
my work does not rest upon economic efficiency as the exclusive goal of
antitrust policy; the Chicagoans, because they may be disinclined to adopt
me as their own!
The crucial step in any preemption case is the characterization of the
federal interest. In the current context, this characterization provides the
measure by which "true public" regulation is to be distinguished from
"mere private" exploitation of state power. After rejecting antidelegation
as a sensible expression of antitrust policy, my article sought to make its
criticism constructive by offering an alternative definition of the federal
antitrust interest. I settled upon efficiency, currently the most widely ac-
cepted formulation of the Sherman Act's goal."0 I noted that the antitrust
case for efficiency is troubling and uncertain, but that the choice is less
troubling than it might otherwise be because a general parallel exists be-
tween an efficiency approach and a just distribution approach.31
My disclaimers did not stop my work from being compartmentalized as
effectively Chicagoan. So I stress that the relevance of my proposal is not
restricted to Chicago believers. My analysis need not be founded exclu-
sively upon a goal of efficiency. If we replace economic efficiency with
distributive justice, my analysis remains essentially the same.
A distributive justice goal can articulate a value judgment that entitles
ultimate or household consumers to the surplus they would derive from
transacting in a market in which producers behave as rivals rather than as
cooperators.3 2 This objective aims to block any effort of cooperating pro-
ducers to take from consumers their competitive just deserts-the rela-
tively low prices and abundant output that producer rivalry promotes. In
the context of antitrust federalism, those unwilling to return to Parker's
greater federal intrusion." Garland, supra note 1, at 487. I further agree that the recent Fisher
opinion is puzzling on its face. See Garland, supra note 1, at 503-06; Wiley, The Berkeley Rent
Control Case: Treating Victims as Villains, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 157. Finally, I agree that several
recent decisions weaken the Midcal standard of review. Compare Garland, supra note 1, at 493 with
Wiley, supra note 1, at 738. These decisions, however, purport to apply rather than overrule the
precedents to which I refer supra note 3. We witness a lively doctrinal tension that needs explaining,
not a "trend" or a "retreat", Garland, supra note 1, at 492, 494, 498, that shows the problem is going
away.
30. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 741, 751.
31. See id. at 713, 750-51 & n.173, 761-62 & n.227.
32. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Effi-
ciency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 74-77 (1982).
1283
The Yale Law Journal
absolute deference to states"3 could make operational this federal distribu-
tive interest by testing state regulations in four steps: (1) Does the state or
local policy restrain market rivalry? (2) Is the policy unprotected by a
federal antitrust exemption? (3) Is it primarily a producer initiative, thus
preliminarily suggesting that the policy is a state-backed effort to appro-
priate consumer wealth for producers? (4) And is the policy most likely to
disadvantage consumers by impairing desirable competition without solv-
ing some serious market problem in a way beneficial to them? If the an-
swer to each question is yes, this distributive justice standard advises a
federal court to invalidate the local policy as preempted by the Sherman
Act.
Consider how this analysis would work in a case like Bates v. State
Bar.31 The Bates Court confronted Arizona's ban on advertising for legal
services. Advertising bans restrain an important aspect of producer ri-
valry. They do not fall within any federal exception to the Sherman Act.
Moreover, the ad ban was almost certainly enacted as a result of decisive
lawyer support, not as the sole or partial consequence of other interests
that favored regulation of lawyers. Finally and most relevant for present
purposes, the Bates Court carefully analyzed the question of whether that
state ban would solve a serious market problem facing consumers. The
Court's moderately intrusive review concluded that the ban was unjusti-
fied; consumers faced no likely market problems that would daunt less
restrictive regulatory alternatives. That is, the ad ban was likely to harm
consumers' welfare. Under this analysis, the Arizona ad ban was a law-
yer-sponsored effort to disadvantage consumers of legal services to the in-
dustry's benefit rather than a regulation in consumers' interest. Under a
preemptive standard of distributive justice, a federal court should invali-
date the Arizona policy because federal consumer legislation-the Sher-
man Act-supersedes it.
The 324 Liquor decision likewise can illustrate the operation of a cap-
ture theory using the criterion of distributive justice rather than efficiency.
New York's markup law satisfies the first two elements of the inquiry
directly: The markup law restrained the central feature of market opera-
tion-price competition-and no relevant federal antitrust exemption for
resale price maintenance has existed since the repeal of the Miller-
Tydings and McGuire Acts. As for the third element, the history of the
markup law discloses a crystal clear heritage of political capture by liquor
33. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 740-41. Significantly, not a single Justice in the recent Fisher
decision accepted Parker's premise that Congress intended that the Sherman Act leave state autonomy
unimpaired. None of the three opinions in the case suggests that the Sherman Act is flatly irrelevant
to public laws like initiatives.
34. 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see also Wiley, supra note 1, at 762-64 (discussing Bates).
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retailers. In 1971, the New York legislature passed the relevant statute in
frank response to "inordinate and continuing emphasis on [liquor retail]
price cutting and price promotions." 5 The legislature in 1971 thus reim-
posed the resale price maintenance that an earlier independent state com-
mission had resoundingly condemned as the indefensible product of indus-
try capture.36 Considering finally the fourth element, the markup law
does not help consumers combat a market problem that harms them. The
state legislature had reported that the regulation was needed to forestall
monopoly resulting from predatory pricing,s3 but the 324 Liquor Court
rightly rejected the predation argument as specious according to federal
antitrust doctrine."' The Sherman Act thus should preempt the markup
rule because it hurts consumers.3 9
35. Final Report, supra note 25, at 35. The SLA in turn promulgated Bulletin 471 in 1973. See
supra note 20.
Regulatory scandal in the early 1960's prompted Governor Rockefeller to appoint the Moreland
Commission to reappraise New York's liquor regulation. After extensive study, the Commission con-
demned the SLA's restrictive liquor regulation as unrelated to its purported goal of promoting tem-
perance and as "dictated by the industry, at the expense of public convenience, logic, and good admin-
istration." N.Y. STATE MORELAND COMM'N ON THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION No. 1, THE LICENSING AND REGULATION OF RETAIL PACKAGE
LIQUOR STORES 28 (Jan. 3, 1964) [hereinafter MORELAND COMM'N, REPORT No. 1]; see also id. at
14, 15, 17-18, 27, 36-37, 39. The Commission recommended widespread deregulation of liquor re-
tailing. The New York legislature reacted in 1964, but only by removing a fraction of the restraints
that the Commission had identified as protectionist favors for liquor retailers. Although diluted, the
1964 revisions evidently stimulated some increase in retail liquor competition. See FINAL REPORT,
supra note 25, at 35.
36. See, e.g., MORELAND COMM'N, supra note 35, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION No. 3,
MANDATORY RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 27-28 (Jan. 21, 1964) ("SLA drafted this basic [resale]
price control pattern under the guidance of the retail package store associations" without meeting with
any "civic interest or social welfare groups, or for that matter any representative of the consuming
public"); MORELAND COMM'N, supra note 35, STUDY PAPER NUMBER 5, RESALE PRICE MAINTE-
NANCE IN THE LIQUOR INDUSTRY 3 (Oct. 28, 1963) ("The main beneficiaries [of NY liquor RPM]
appear to have been the New York State retailers, the main victims, the New York State
consumers.").
37. Final Report, supra note 25, at 29-30. See also J.A.J. Liquor Store v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 64 N.Y.2d 504, 520 (1985). The pretextual quality of this reasoning is evident to anyone
wondering why the process has not yet produced monopolies in, for instance, hamburger or soft drink
retailing.
38, That doctrine reports "a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried, [and] even more rarely successful." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357-58 (1986). One cannot use theory to rule out predatory pricing as inevitably
irrational. E.g., Milgrom & Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. FCON.
THEORY 280 (1982). But fears of predatory pricing are particularly implausible in a market as un-
concentrated and easy to enter as liquor retailing. See 324 Liquor, 107 S. Ct. at 725 n.5; Cargill, Inc.
v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 494 n.15 (1986) (significant market power and high entry
barriers are prerequisites to successful predatory pricing). The Moreland Commission concluded that
"[tihe operation of a package store is relatively uncomplicated and requires little special skill or expe-
rience." MORELAND COMM'N, REPORT No. 1, supra note 35, at 8. The only significant barriers to
entering liquor retailing thus were created by the state of New York itself.
39. A markup law conceivably could serve consumer interests, but such circumstances did not
exist in 324 Liquor. People preferring the existence of a small business sector for instrumental or
intrinsic reasons may have difficulty expressing their views through markets. See, e.g., Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 242-44 (1985). For instance, people might
believe small shop ownership builds civic virtue or increases contributions to the Republican party or
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III. A DANGER TO FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY?
Finally, Mr. Garland attacks my proposal as posing three dangers: con-
fusion, unconstitutional abridgement of free speech, and a return to the
one thing that all right-thinking lawyers reject-the hated Lochner. I
demur.
A. What Is "Producer Capture"?
I argue that federal courts could use the notion of producer capture to
limit their review to those state and local regulations that pose efficiency
or distributive concerns. Mr. Garland explores the clarity of the concept
of producer capture by posing two hypotheticals: a regulation that limits
condominium conversion, and the federal air bag rule.
40
The capture concept derives from Mancur Olson's insight that free rid-
ers can lead to the "'exploitation' of the great by the small."'41 Producer
capture occurs when a relatively concentrated industry pits its superior
capacity for group action-which arises, ironically, from the relative few-
ness of its members-against numerous poorly organized consumers to
win an anticompetitive restraint at consumers' expense. Cases that do not
fit this pattern are beyond this model's limited capacity to account for the
phenomenon of regulation, and so should escape further federal review.
Federal judges could thus filter regulations with the concept of producer
capture to distinguish regulations that deserve federal scrutiny from those
that do not.
Mr. Garland's condominium hypothetical presents the "[b]ootleggers
and Baptists" problem:42 a regulation like a Sunday closing law for bars
and liquor stores, supported both by suppliers looking for anticompetitive
protection and by others.4 Cases like this present a factual question: Was
the suppliers' support for the conversion regulation decisive? A condomin-
ium regulation case where mixed support is virtually balanced defines the
is simply a good thing, period. A mandatory markup law therefore could effectuate popular and
intense preferences for small business-if such preferences truly exist. Capture theory, however, urges
extreme skepticism about the authenticity of such claimed popular preferences when their only exposi-
tor is the industry itself.
In 324 Liquor the stated justification for the markup regulation was its role as a tool against
monopoly, not as a product of popular desire for small scale retailing per se. The 356 pages of the
Moreland Commission reports, moreover, refer to "the small business ethic of our community" only
once, and then only to dismiss the argument as an inadequate justification for restrictive retail regula-
tion. See MORELAND COMM'N, REPORT No. 1, supra note 35, at 33-35.
40. See Garland, supra note 1, at 517.
41. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 29 (1965) (citations omitted).
42. Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, REG.,
May-June 1983, at 12, 13.
43. Wiley, supra note 1, at 770. Condominium owners are suppliers of housing who logically
could support conversion limitations as a barrier to new entry; renters are household consumers whose
support would be based on other factors.
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sort of borderline case that exists for every fact-based legal rule. In factu-
ally close cases, I reiterate that the producer capture question "remains
theoretically coherent, analytically tractable (particularly when combined
with a suitably demanding burden of proof that plaintiffs must satisfy),
and analogous to other questions that courts routinely settle."
44
The air bag hypothetical also yields to Olsonian logic. Mr. Garland
points out that producers, like insurance companies, can join with Ralph
Nader to combat the automobile industry for an air bag rule.45 But al-
though insurers are producers, they often "represent consumer inter-
ests."48 When they do so, insurers act on consumers' behalf to reduce
costs, rather than against consumers to appropriate monopoly or cartel
profits from them. Such cases fall outside the Olsonian paradigm of indus-
try versus consumers, and so should escape preemption under a capture
theory of antitrust federalism. 7
B. Would a Capture Test Violate the First Amendment?
Mr. Garland raises free speech objections to my proposed use of pro-
ducer capture as a screen for signalling whether a challenged state policy
warrants federal suspicion. Take for instance the Bates example.' 8 In that
case, a capture preemption test would ask whether the organized bar-as
opposed to some other set of interests-were the primary sponsor of the
ban on lawyer ads. If the legal industry indeed were the main force be-
hind the regulation, its support would create an Olsonian hint that the
ban could be a selfish industry effort to bilk consumers, and that a federal
court should inquire further into the regulation's justifications. If some
group other than lawyers were primarily responsible for the regulation,
however, the court should keep its hands entirely off the regulation be-
cause it presumably is founded upon some public interest rationale-a
rationale beyond antitrust concern. The 324 Liquor case demonstrates
44. Wiley, supra note 1, at 770.
45. To make the air bag case an antitrust federalism rather than an antitrust exemption problem,
assume that a state or local government enacted a rule requiring auto makers to offer an air bag
option on new cars,
46. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 360 (1982) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); cf FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2020 (1986) (insurers can represent
consumer interests in dealings with other producers).
47. Mr. Garland also argues that my proposed inquiry would cause massive and unwarranted
preemption of state law. He supports his conclusion by disjunctively analyzing each step of a conjunc-
tive test. See Garland, supra note 1, at 508, 510 (laundry list of regulations "could all be overturned"
by one prong of test), 516 (different prong of test "is likely to do little else than put enormous discre-
tionary power into the hands of an unelected judiciary"). By this reasoning, critics could fault hot tea
because plain water lacks flavor and dry tea sticks to the tongue. Mr. Garland does not do what his
"unwarranted preemption" argument demands; he does not illustrate a single instance in which the
entire test would in fact cause inappropriate preemption. Indeed, Mr. Garland's air bag hypothetical
discloses that my proposal is narrower than he seems to fear.
48. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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that the concept of producer capture is clear in practical application. Mr.
Garland objects, claiming that to. draw presumptive suspicion from an in-
dustry's decisive support for a challenged regulation is to "impos[e] a pen-
alty on rights that are at the core of the First Amendment: the right to
debate public issues, to petition the government, and to seek to influence
the outcome of the political process." 4  *
Mr. Garland's "penalty" logic packs quite a punch. Courts routinely
study the origin and legislative history of a challenged law. They seek to
infer the law's true character and function from its supporters' identities
and arguments. If these inferences from legislative history lead judges to
negative conclusions about the law's constitutionality, then Mr. Garland
would say that courts are using the supporters' political speeches and ac-
tions to help invalidate the law. Logically, then, Mr. Garland's argument
expands to assert that a court violates the First Amendment whenever its
historical investigation "penalizes" political actors by supporting a judicial
conclusion distasteful to them.
This claim cannot be right. If the argument holds water, then the Can-
tor Court violated the First Amendment rights of the Detroit Edison
Company by noting (to Edison's detriment) that "there can be no doubt
that the option to have, or not to have, [a challenged program regulated by
state law] is primarily [Edison's], not the Commission's." 0 The Washing-
ton Apple Court then violated the free speech rights of local industry
when, en route to invalidating a state law as an impermissible restraint of
interstate commerce, it stressed that the industry was "mainly responsible
for this legislation being passed.151 And a court would violate the speech
rights of racist legislators if it used their comments in the legislative his-
tory to decide that a challenged state law was discriminatory and thus
violative of equal protection.5 2 I do not think Mr. Garland would wish to
pursue his argument this far.
49. Garland, supra note 1, at 512-13.
50. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594 (1976). Mr. Garland agrees that "one
can read" Cantor thus. Garland, supra note 1, at 513 n.161. He argues, however, that Cantor drew
different inferences from the fact of industry involvement than did two earlier cases. Id. This does not
work. The inconsistency shows only instability within antitrust federalism law (which I heartily ac-
knowledge), not what Mr. Garland needs to get his argument off the ground, which is a later Court's
free speech rejection of the error of the Cantor Court's ways. Second, Mr. Garland claims that Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), "effectively abandoned that element of Cantor." Id. Once again,
nothing Mr. Garland cites offers First Amendment support for his analysis. In short, Cantor saw no
constitutional barrier to, or even issue in, drawing the inference I urge.
51. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352 (1977). Mr. Gar-
land does not respond to my earlier citation of this case. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 760 n.308.
52. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of discriminatory racial pur-
pose to establish equal protection violation).
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C. Would a Capture Test Recapitulate Lochner?
Finally, Mr. Garland says that my proposal would commit the Lochner
sin. Everyone knows that this sin is bad. We are left only with the task of
defining it.
Mr. Garland seems to mean that the Lochner sin occurs when federal
judges overturn state policies on the basis of substantive federal values at
some remove from a highly elaborated official text. That is, Lochner
equals "discretionary power by federal judges."'53 Or put otherwise, Loch-
ner represents substantive due process." But substantive due process of
one form or another has survived the universal condemnation of Lochner
with great vitality. Indeed, many commentators have labeled the Court's
commercial speech doctrine as Lochneresque, and that doctrine has pro-
duced many constitutional results identical to the statutory holdings that
would follow from a capture theory of antitrust federalism.55 So I reject
this meaning of Lochner. It does not isolate the thing that everyone
condemns.
A different definition of Lochner's evil stresses its virtually irreversible
constitutional condemnation of state law on the basis of highly debatable
constitutional values.56  This feature was singular-and singularly
bad-about Lochner. This feature is not present in a capture theory of
antitrust federalism (or indeed in any theory of statutory construction).
Mr. Garland acknowledges my point, but dismisses it as technical de-
tail. 57 I disagree. Congressional power to govern is of more than mere
technical significance. The ability of a federal majority to express its will
makes the difference between oligarchy and democracy. This difference is
plain from the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984.51 That statute
adjusts remedies available in municipal antitrust preemption litigation,
and thus illustrates a point that should be obvious: Congress indeed can
exercise its power to govern, in the antitrust field as elsewhere. More spe-
cifically, this antitrust law reaffirms the duty of federal courts to review
the antitrust acceptability of municipal policy. 59 Thus not only can Con-
gress amend antitrust law; it has done so and has directed the judiciary to
exercise federal supervision over local policy. That is democracy, not
Lochner.
53. Garland, supra note 1, at 509.
54. Id. at 488 n.7 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
55. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 779 & nn.306-07.
56. This was Holmes' objection. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.").
57. Garland, supra note 1, at 512 (congressional supremacy as "escape hatch").
58. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36 (West Supp. 1986)).
59. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 777-78 n.299.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Debates like this one have a known tendency to waterlog even the most
buoyant reader. Nonetheless I have responded to Mr. Garland's main
criticisms of my argument. Mr. Garland raises several issues, but a cap-
ture theory of antitrust federalism withstands his critique.
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